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RECENT CASES
Criminal Law-Fugitive Felon Act-Refusal of State's Witness
to Answer Questions Tending to Incriminate Him Under Federal
Law-Granted immunity from state prosecution, 1 Charles Hemans
testified against co-conspirators before a Michigan grand jury. Thereafter,
he fled to Washington, D. C., and refused to return for further questioning.
After being indicted under § 2 of the Federal Fugitive Felon Act 2 as a
fugitive witness, he was returned to Michigan. At the preliminary examination of his former associates, he refused to answer certain questions
because his answers might incriminate him under the federal action against
him then pending. His position was upheld by the trial judge, and on
appeal, this decision was affirmed. People v. Den Uyl, 29 N. W. 2d 284
(Mich. 1947). Subsequently, he was convicted of the federal offense, and
on appeal, his conviction was affirmed, § 2 of the Act being declared constitutional. Hemans v. United States, 163 F. 2d 228 (C. C. A. 6th 1947),
cert. pending.
Immunity statutes have resolved most law enforcement difficulties
arising from the witness' privilege not to give self-incriminating testimony,
but the possibility of prosecution outside the jurisdiction still raises a problem. 3 In Michigan, a witness is not required to give answers "that would
lead straight to Federal prosecution." 4 All other courts, before which
similar problems have come for decision, have held that the privilege does
not apply where foreign prosecution is the only possibility.5 Two reasons
are generally given for this latter position: (1) it is too difficult to ascertain foreign law; (2) the danger of foreign prosecution is too remote and
1. MIcH. STAT. ANN. §28,946 (1936).
2. "It shall be unlawful for any person to move or travel in interstate or foreign
commerce . . . with intent either (1) to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction for murder, kidnapping, burglary, robbery, mayhem, rape, . . . ;
or (2) to avoid giving testimony in any criminal proceedings in such place in which
the commission of a felony is charged. . . . Violations of this section may be prosecuted only in the Federal judicial distict in which the original crime was alleged to
have been committed. . . ." 48 STAT. 782 (1934), 18 U. S. C. § 408e (1940), as
amended, 60 STAT. 789, 18 U. S. C. A. § 408e (Supp. 1946).
3. United States v. Feldman, 322 U. S. 487 (1944), held that evidence obtained
under state grant of immunity was admissible in subsequent federal proceedings, provided that federal agents had not merely used the state court as their instrument.
4. See In re Watson, 293 Mich. 263, 285, 291 N. W. 652, 661 (1940) (the Michigan rule was herein announced by way of dictum).
5. This position has been asserted categorically in WIGmORE, EVIDENcE (Stud. ed.
1935), § 374(3) ; cf. 4 WIGMOPE (2d ed. 1905), § 2258. The cases fall in line as follows: (A) Danger of incrimination under the laws of a foreign sovereign, Republic of

Greece v. Koukouras, 264 Mass. 318, 162 N. E. 345 (1928) ; King of Two Sicilies v.

Willcox, 7 State Trials (N. S.) 1049, 1068, 61 Eng. Rep. 116, 128 (1851) ; see In re

Atherton, [1912] 2 K. B. 251. But cf. United States of America v. MacRae, L. R. 4
Eq. 327, 329, L. R. 3 Ch. App. 79, 87 (1867). (B) Danger of incrimination under laws
of another state. State v. March, 1 Jones L. 526 (N. C. 1854) ; State v. Wood, 99 Vt.

490, 134 Atl. 697 (1926) ; see Note 48 A. L. R. 991 ; In re Cappeau, 198 App. Div. 357,
190 N. Y. S. 452 (1921) (alternative holding) ; In re Werner, 167 App. Div. 384, 152
N. Y. S. 862 (1915). (C) Danger of incrimination under federal law. People v. Butler St. Foundry Co., 201 Ill. 236, 66 N. E. 349 (1903) ; State v. Jack, 69 Kan. 387, 396,
76 Pac. 911, 914 (1904), aff'd. 199 U. S. 372 (1905). See Doyle v. Hofstader, 257 N. Y.
244, 267, 177 N. E. 489, 497 (1931). (D) After almost uniform decisions to the con-

trary in lower federal courts, and considerable vacillation itself, the Supreme Court

seems to have decided with sufficient clarity in favor of the majority rule. United
States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141 (1931).
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appliunsubstantial for recognition. The latter reason is simply a specific
6
cation of the law pertinent to the ordinary intrastate situation. Both
reasons might be controlling when applied to appropriate fact situations,
but to use them to support a rule of general application is mistaken logic.
Specifically, state courts take judicial notice of federal laws. The principal case is but one vivid example of the reality of the danger of prosecution.7 The necessity for interstate rendition, which sometimes might lessen

the danger of future prosecution, is a possible basis for distinguishing the
"interstate" cases.8 In some cases there are hints that, had the danger
been demonstrably real, the privilege would have been granted; 1 but with
other courts, unreality of the danger seemingly operates as a controlling
The difficulties of law enforcement in modem times and the
fiction.'0
outspoken criticism of the privilege against self-incrimination " no doubt
motivate courts to further the policy behind immunity statutes. The witness' privilege, however, undoubtedly encourages voluntary testimony in
many instances, 12 thus smoothing, to some extent, the path of prosecution.
3
Moreover, as part of our constitutional structure,' it is due more than lip
service. The Michigan court has previously shown a wise restraint in
granting the privilege,' 4 and to give it vitality seems to be entirely sound.
Consideration of the policies involved in the Federal Fugitive Felon Act
might, however, throw some doubt on the propriety of this decision on the
instant facts.
Section 2 of this Act is a regulation of the passage of persons between
states under the interstate commerce clause,' 5 and represents a Congressional attempt to place this Act beside a number of predecessors.' 6 Those
acts seek to prevent the pollution of the channels of commerce by persons
6. Marshall's rule, as propounded in 1 Aaron Burr's Trial, Robertson's Report
243 (1807), has generally been followed. For a clearer statement see Lord Cockburne in Reg. v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311, 321 (1861). This rule has been applied in
Michigan in the extra-state situation in: In re Schnitzer, 295 Mich. 736, 295 N. W. 475
(1940) ; In re Ward, 295 Mich. 742, 295 N. W. 483 (1940) ; In re Cohen, 295 Mich.
748, 295 N. W. 481 (1940).
7. See Comment, 41 YALE L. J. 618, 621, 622 (1932), discussing Doyle v. Hofstader, supra note 5(C). Cf. United States v. Feldman, supra note 3.
8. Cases cited supra note 5(B). A fortiori the cases cited note 5(A).
9. Republic of Greece v. Koukouras, supra note 5(A) (judicial notice taken of
absence of extradition treaty). Compare U. S. v. MacRae, mspra note 5(A), with
dictum in Kingdom of Two Sicilies, supra note 5 (A), at page cited. In People v. Butler Street Foundry Co. and State v. Jack, supra note 5(C), and In re Werner, supra
note 5 (B), the court at least examined the extent of the chance of foreign prosecution.
But see In re Atherton, supra note 5 (A).
10. In re Cappeau, supra note 5(B). Compare United States v. Murdock, supra
note 5(D), with Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896). See Doyle v. Hofstader,
supra note 5 (C), at page cited.
11. See BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 452-460 (Vol. VIII, Bowring's ed. 1827); Knox, Self-Incrimination, 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 139 (1925). For
weighty criticism of accused's privilege not to testify, see 4 UNITED STATES NATIONAL
COMISSION ON LAW AND LAW ENFORCEMENT (Wickersham Comm.) 25, 26 (1931) ;
FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN NEW

43 (1939).
12. See 4 WIGMORE, p. 3095 (2d ed. 1905).
13. The privilege is part of the constitution of every state except Iowa and New

YORK STATE

Jersey, where it is a common-law rule of evidence. As embodied in U. S. CoNsT.
AMEND. V it is inapplicable to state proceedings.
14. Note 9 supra.
15. U. S. CONsT. Art. I, § 8.
16. White Slave Traffic Act: 36 STAT. 827, 18 U. S. C. §§ 397-404 (1910), Hoke
v. United States, 227 U. S. 308 (1913) ; National Motor Vehicle Theft Act: 41 STAT.
324 (1919), 18 U. S. C. § 408 (1940), as amended, 59 STAT. 536 (1945), 18 U. S. C.
§ 408 (Supp. 1946), Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432 (1925) ; Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act: 34 STAT. 768 (1906), 21 U. S. C. §§ 1-15 (1940), repealed,
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using them to further what is already a crime or is detrimental to the
welfare of society; the Supreme Court upheld their constitutionality on
the rationale that Congress can protect interstate commerce by punishing
anyone who makes it a vehicle of crime or uses it to promote immorality,
17
dishonesty, or the spreading of harm to the citizens of other states.
Although a state can subpoena and, if necessary, confine a witness to insure
his presence at criminal proceedings, he cannot be extradited if he flees to
avoid testifying. 18 Section 2 of the Act was passed to remedy this situation.' 9 Today's ease of movement requires the rendition of fugitive witnesses for efficient state law enforcement. The analogy of § 2 to its
predecessors does exist, for such wrongful conduct sufficiently affects the
20
flow of commerce. to render this Congressional regulation constitutional.
The constitutionality of § 2, however, does not of itself make the
affirmance of Hemans' conviction proper.2 1 That this case of first impression occurred thirteen years after the passage of the Act highlights the
purpose of § 2, which was satisfied when Hemans wa4 returned. 22. The
reason for his punishment-1,000 fine and four years imprisonmentappears to lie outside his violation of § 2. No doubt the Act could be used
as a convenient means of "encouraging" testimony, and it is possible that
had Hemans testified fully against Den Uyl the federal indictment might
have been dropped. If this were so the Michigan court could have refused
him the privilege against self-incrimination; but a court could hardly be
expected to reach such a decision based on this unwritten policy, for the
52 STAT. 1059 (1938), new, 52 STAT. 1040 (1938), 21 U. S. C. §§301-392 (1940), as
amended, 21 U. S. C. §§ 331-392 (Supp. 1946), Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 270
U. S. 45 (1911) ; Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S.
C. §§201-219 (1940), United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941) ; Section 1 of the
Federal Fugitive Felon Act: see note 2 supra, Simmons v. Zerbst, 18 F. Supp. 929
(N. D. Ga. 1937) ; United States v. Miller, 17 F. Supp. 65 (W. D. Ky. 1936).
17. Cases cited note 16 supra.
18. The right of extradition between states applies only to those persons charged
with a crime. U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 2.
19. See note 2 supra. The Act, passed in the heyday of John Dillinger, and like
criminals, was ifitended to return those key witnesses who fled because they were associates in the gang or because of threats. 78 CONG. REc. 5736 (1934).
20. In discussing the general privilege of citizens to pass freely between states
as applied to the use of interstate commerce for transporting women for immoral purposes, Mr. Justice McKenna said, "It is misleading to say that men and women have
rights. Their rights cannot fortify or sanction their wrongs; and if they employ interstate transportation as a facility of their wrongs, it may be forbidden to them. .... "
Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 323 (1913). For a worthy discussion of the
constitutionality of § 2 of the Act, read Toy and Shepherd, Congressional Powers to
Restrain Interstate Flight of Witnesses in Criminal Cases, 4 DETROIT L. REV. 133
(1934).
21. The court could have reached an opposite result by using the technical argument (1) that conspiracy at common law was not a felony, but only a misdemeanor,
and therefore, not within the import of the Act [this reasoning was applied in United
States v. Brandenburg, 144 F. 2d 656 (C. C. A. 3rd 1944), which involved burglary
by explosives] ; or (2) of an ejusdem generis interpretation to determine what felonies are included in § 2. Regarding the latter argument, Congress was careful of its
exact wording [78 CONG. REc. 5737, 8129, 8777 (1934)] and said in this second separate section ". .

. in which the commission of a felony is charged," not an above

enumerated felony (italics ours). It should also be noted that a fugitive witness can
be convicted under § 2 of the Act for fleeing to avoid testifying in a case where none
of the actual defendants could be convicted under § 1 had they fled. This incongruous
result should not void § 2, but Congress should bring the two sections into conformity
with each other, preferably by enlarging the scope of § 1. If Congressional revision
occurs, creating a separate and lesser penalty for violating § 2 would end another
source of difficulty.
22. See note 19 supra.
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23
possibility of prosecution is sufficient for the assertion of this privilege.
However, the severity of his sentence, compared with the punishment for
contempt, makes it appear to be punishment for his part in the original
conspiracy. If this is so, he was in effect punished despite his state-granted
immunity and without the opportunity to defend himself. Similar reasons
for severe sentences under other federal statutes are not unknown, but these
statutes punish conduct ordinarily considered to be far more criminal than
that of being a fugitive witness. 24 The effectiveness of the Act depends
on the efficiency of the federal law enforcement agencies rather than on the
deterrent value of the penalty provided. Thus Hemans' prosecution and
sentence, which appear to use the Act in a manner foreign to its purpose,
may actually be harmful in that a reversal by the Supreme Court would
seriously hamper the effectiveness of this socially expedient legislation.

Corporations-Directors May Be Liable for Losses Resulting
From Anti-Labor Practices-In a derivative suit the complaint
alleged, inter alia, that defendant officers and directors caused the removal
of corporate plants and equipment, and the intentional curtailment of production with resultant loss to the corporation in excess of $1,000,000, not
for legitimate business reasons, but solely for the purpose of intimidating
and punishing employees by removing hopes of re-employment. It was
further alleged that defendants injured the company and violated their
trust by permitting one of their number to dominate the corporation's labor
policy although they realized that he was motivated, not by the welfare of
the corporation, but by his personal antipathy towards labor. Upon appeal, a divided court (four to three). reversed the Appellate Division and
held that the complaint was sufficient to support an action. Abrams v.
Allen, 297 N. Y. 52, 74 N. E. 2d 305 (1947).
Modern large-scale corporate enterprise necessarily interposes the
artificial device of directorship between the owner and his property. As
a counterbalance to the discretionary power over the property of the shareholders which resides in a board of directors considerable protection is
necessary. Legal protection has its roots in the statement of Lord Hardwicke more than two centuries ago, when he declared that directors have
a responsibility for their stewardship.- The lawyer's chief difficulty has
been in determining the limits of that liability. Courts have used both
trust 2 and agency 3 language, as a rationalization for directorial liability,
thereby predetermining their judgments.4 Sounder reasoning discloses that
"directors" are, in their relationship to the corporation, neither "trustee"
nor "agent." The concept of "director" has its own totality of legal relationships. In evolving one of these relationships-that of the power of
23. 1 Aaron Burr's Trial, Robertson's Rep. 208, 244 (1807) ; see Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 564, 586 (1892).
24. E. g., Income tax evasion or transporting women for immoral purposes.
1. The Charitable Corporation v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400, 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (Ch. 1742).
2. See Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N. Y. 157, 164, 165, 61 N: E. 163, 164, 165 (1901);
Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 88 N. Y. 52, 58, 59 (1882).
3. See Ray County Savings Bank v. Hutton, 224 Mo. 42, 71, 123 S. W. 47, 56
(1909) ; Bosworth v. Allen, supra note 2.
4. A discussion which illustrates the analyses courts have applied to directors
and the various standards of care is contained in Note, Liability of Directorsfor Negligent Mismanagement, 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 364 (1934).
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directors to utilize corporate resources in the conduct of the enterpriseAmerican courts have run the gamut of possible standards of directorial
conduct. The tests applied have been (1) that of an ordinary man in the
conduct of his own affairs, 5 (2) the standard of a "prudent man" in
similar circumstances,6 and (3) the now-discredited "gross negligence" or
"gratuitous mandatory" theories.7
The divorce of ownership from management, which becomes more
complete as our combines grow in size and wealth,8 deprives the shareholder, among other things, of any immediate control over the labor policy
of his enterprise. In certain other areas of managerial liability there have
been statutory attempts to enforce minimum standards, e. g., the establishment of the SEC.9 In the instant case the standard is judicial. But even
if this decision be regarded as a, deterrent to labor policies which may cause
foreseeable financial loss to a corporation, it is, in the instant case, an
"after-the-horse-has-been-stolen" result. This persistently violent antilabor program suggests several theories of responsibility, e. g., negligence, 1
waste," or conversion.12 Certainly those corporate officers who henceforth decide in favor of a similar course of anti-labor activity will have to
weigh the consequences beforehand to discover whether the extent of the
probable harm will restrict the use of so unusual a "business judgment." 3
Surely the reasonableness of a director's judgment must be questioned4
where it results not only in the.very injuries decried by the legislature,'
but also in substantial damage to the enterprise for whose purported benefit
the program was initiated.

Federal Gift Tax-Transfer of United States Treasury Notes by
Non-Resident Alien-Petitioner, a non-resident alien, converted certain domestic securities into United States Treasury notes, intending to
make a gift of such notes in trust within the provisions of a statute exempting from all taxation imposed after 1918 any notes of the United States
beneficially owned by a non-resident alien.' Over a period of eight months,
5. Hun v. Cary, 82 N. Y. 65 (1880).
6. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132 (1891).
7. Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11 (1872).
8. See BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 18118 (1932).
9. See, e. g., The Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 77a
(1940) ; The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 881 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 78a
(1940) ; The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 838 (1935), 15
U. S. C. § 79 (1940).
10. Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 223 N. Y. 103, 119 N. E. 237 (1918).
11. Hazard v. Wight, 201 N. Y. 399, 94 N. E. 855 (1911).
12. Pollitz v. Wabash R. Co., 207 N. Y. 113, 100 N. E. 721 (1912).
13. Upon motion for re-argument, counsel for defendants presented a variation of
an argument advanced decades ago when stricter standards were first proposed for
directors and it was predicted worthy men would shun such responsibilities. Counsel
argued that this decision would discourage men of ability from serving as directors
because their every disinterested action could now be questioned by time-consuming
law suits, if the shareholders disagreed with corporate policy. [Brief in Support of
Motion by Defendants-Respondents for Reargument, pp. 2, 3.] The popularity of the
"business judgment" rule in New York is indicated in Carson, Further Phases of Derivative Actions Against Directors,29 CORN. L. Q. 431 (1944).
14. See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151
(1940); New York State Labor Relations Act, N. Y. CONSOL. LAWS (McKinney,
1940), Bk. 30, § 700.
1. ". . . bonds, notes, and certificates of indebtedness of the United States and
bonds of the War Finance Corporation shall, while beneficially owned by a non-resi-
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trustee sold the Treasury notes, reinvesting the proceeds in domestic
securities. The Commissioner determined that the gift did not constitute
notes of the United States within the meaning of the statute. The Tax
Court, one judge dissenting without opinion, upheld the Commissioner.
Marie-Anne de Goldschmidt-Rothschild, CCH TAx CT. RaP. (REG.)

Dec.

16010 (1947).

With the blessing of the Supreme Court,2 tax lawyers and their clients
have long indulged in the lucrative, but often baffling, sport of arranging
their affairs to escape tax burdens. Regardless of the motive of the taxpayer, if the transaction is legal and in good faith, 3 it will not be disturbed.4 The plan here employed by the petitioner was not only legal, but
was actually invited by the statute. 5 If the gift in trust had actually been
one of Treasury notes, it would have been tax-exempt. In finding that the
transaction was a mere subterfuge for a gift of income-producing domestic
securities, the court pointed out that the conversion of the domestic stock
was without independent business significance.6 While the test of "business
significance" has been employed by the Supreme Court in connection with
a tax avoidance plan under a corporate reorganization statute,7 there is
nothing to indicate that the statute under the protection of which petitioner
purported to act required such significance. But without such a test there
is little in the way of an objective standard by which to judge the reality
of the taxpayer's act.8 And militating against the conclusion that there
was a prearranged plan was the length of time that the Treasury notes
were a part of the corpus of the trust.9 .The decision reflects a growing
antipathy for the preferential treatment accorded particular classes of
holders of U. S. securities. 10
But inasmuch as the invitation to foreign
investors to deal in U. S. treasury notes was issued by Congress, the Tax
Court might well have left it to the Congress to whittle away at the privilege
afforded by the invitation.
dent alien individual . . . be exempt both as to principal and interest from any and
alltaxation imposed on July 9, 1918, or thereafter by the United States, any State, or
any of the possessions of the United States, or by any local taxing authority." 40 STAT.
845 (1918), as amended, 31 U. S. C. § 750 (1940). This exemption is limited to securities issued prior to March 1, 1941. U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.2(a) (1943).
2. U. S. v. Isham, 17 Wall. 496. 506 (U. S. 1873).
3. The "good faith" requirement is directed toward the reality of the transaction,
rather than to the probity of the taxpayer. Schoenberg v. Com. of Int. Rev., 77 F. 2d
446, 449 (C. C. A. 9th 1935).
4. Board of Comm'rs v. State Board of Taxes, 107 N. J. L. 195, 156 Atl. 377
(1931), aff'd, 108 N. J. L. 195, 156 At. 377 (1931) ; 2 CooLEY, TAxATION § 548 (4th
ed. 1924).
5. When planning the trust, petitioner was informed by an official
of the trust
company of the tax saving afforded by the statute. Inst. case at 2340.
6. Inst. case at 2345.
7. Gregory v. Helvering, "293 U. S. 465 (1935). Where a bank has purchased
tax-exempt U. S. bonds prior to tax assessment day and has reconverted shortly thereafter, the courts are divided on the use of business significance as a touchstone. Compare Board of Comm'rs v. State Board of Taxes, supra, with In re People's Bank of
Vermont, 203 Ill. 300, 67 N. E. 777 (1903).
8. There was no direct evidence of an agreement by the trustee to reconvert to
domestic securities. But cf. Reginald Fincke, 39 B. T. A. 510 (1939), where transfer
was held final even though the trustee told the taxpayer in advance of the transfer that
the stock would be sold promptly.
9. See Marston v. Commissioner, 75 F. 2d 936 (C. C. A. 2d 1935), where the
court held deductible a loss sustained on sale by taxpayer to a trust created by his wife,
of which he was trustee and one of the beneficiaries, and from which he repurchased
the stock a year later.
10. See 87 CONG. REc. 852 et seq. (1941).
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Income Taxation-Allowance of Deduction as Business Expense
for Amounts Paid as Dividends on Short Sale-The taxpayer was engaged in business as a trader of securities for his own account throughout
the taxable years 1938-1940, and during that period, was continuously in a
short ' position. He paid sums equal to the dividends declared on the stock
which he borrowed for delivery on his short transactions to the lenders of
the stock, and deducted the amounts, in the years paid, as business expenses. 2 The Commissioner disallowed these deductions, contending instead,
that the payments might be added to the cost of the securities purchased for
the covering transactions in computing the capital gain or loss. 3 In a
memorandum opinion the Tax Court allowed the deductions.4 The Ninth
Circuit Court, though indicating its agreement on the merits, affirmed on
the ground that "this case is one peculiarly within the authority of the Tax
Court and a proper case to apply the case of Dobson v. Commissioner
." Commissioner v. Wilson, 163 F. 2d 680 (C. C. A. 9th 1947).
Unfortunately, the propriety of the application of the Dobson rule is
not beyond doubt, 6 hence a discussion of the substantive problem is in
order. Whereas in the instant case purchasing and selling commissions on
security transactions were distinguished from dividend-payments, 7 the absence of a compelling reason so to distinguish was underlying the basis of
the contra decision in Commissioner v. Levis' Estate.8 But, a regulation
1. Provost v. U. S., 269 U. S. 443, 450-452 (1926).

".

.

. a short sale is a con-

tract for the sale of shares which the seller does not own or the certificates for which
are not within his control so as to be available for delivery at the time when, under
the rules of the Exchange, delivery must be made. Under the rules of the New York
Stock Exchange . . . a broker who sells stock is required to make delivery of the
certificates on the next business day. If he does not have them available, he must procure them for the purpose of making delivery. This he may do by purchasing or borrowing the required shares, delivery of the certificates to be made to the broker to
whom he has already contracted to sell.
"If he borrows them, he deposits with the lending broker their full market price;
. . . The lender, who thus receives in money the full market value of the sharesmuch more than he would ordinarily realize by pledging them-usually pays interest
on the money so received, . . .
"During the continuance of the loan the borrowing broker is bound by the loan
contract to give the lender all the benefits and the lender is bound to assume all the
burdens incident to ownership of the stock. . . . The borrower must accordingly
credit the lender with the amount of any dividends paid upon the stock while the loan
continues. . .
2. INT. REv. CoDE § 23(a) (1) (A).
3. The Commissioner's treatment, though decreasing the capital gain, would, in a
long term transaction, increase the taxpayer's total tax incidence because, by virtue of
the long term capital gain provision, only 50% of the payment would have any effect
when the tax on the capital gain is computed.
4. 5 CCH T. C. DEC. 15,313(M) (1946).
5. Instant case at 682. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489 (1943) announced
the rule that appellate courts should not consider and review as questions of law those
matters which really are disputes over proper tax accounting. There is an extensive
discussion of the Dobson case by Randolph E. Paul at 57 HARv. L. REv. 753 (1944).
6. Diamond, Current Decisions on Non-Trade or Non-Business Deductions in
NYU FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 722, 726 (1946).
7. Purchasing commissions were held not deductible in Helvering v. Winmill, 305
U. S. 79 (1938) ; selling commissions also not deductible, Spreckels v. Helvering, 315
U. S. 626 (1942).
8. 127 F. 2d 796 (C. C. A. 2d 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 645 (1942). But the
court seemed to be on the wrong track when it inferred that it would allow the dividend-payments as an expense to a dealer, i. e., one who buys and sells securities, not
for his own account, but for resale to customers, because commissions are allowed as
expenses to dealers. 'Dealers are allowed to treat commissions as expenses because of
accounting difficulties. (See Spreckels v. Helvering, mpra note 7 at 629.) But if a
dealer sells short, to that extent, he becomes a trader for his own account, since the
motive for a short sale is to obtain a profit by buying the stock at a later date at a
lower price. (See Knowlton v. Fitch, 52 N. Y. 288, 289 (1873)).
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promulgated under the. 1916 Income Tax law treated commissions in
security transactions as capital itemsY The original taxing provisions on

which the regulation rested were never changed and the courts have uni10
There has never been a regulation
formly given effect to this regulation.
covering the payments-for-dividends invblved in a short sale. However,
the question of their treatment was considered in a Treasury Department
ruling 11 under the Act of 1921 wherein it was decided that the payments
were to be added to the cost price of the securities. The Solicitor of2
Internal Revenue reached a like conclusion in an early memorandum.1
In the first cases before the Board of Tax Appeals, Terbell v. Commis14
sioner 13 and Dart v. Commissioner, the board refused to allow the decase,
it
was found that the taxpayer was not
Terbell
ductions. But, in the
engaged in the business of trading in securities, hence there was no business
expense. On the other hand, the taxpayer in the Dart case, though not a
dealer, 15 was found to be a business-trader, and the Fourth Circuit Court
reversed the board on the ground that the dividend-payments add nothing
to the value of any capital property and are merely expenses necessary to
the maintenance of the short seller's position in the market.'6 The distinction, based on whether or not the taxpayer was in the business of trading in securities or only a casual trader, persisted in all the cases until a
1942 amendment to the Revenue Code which provided for deductions of
non-business expenses. 17 In every case where it was determined that the
Commistaxpayer was in the business of trading in securities, except for
8
sioner v. Levis' Estate, supra, the court allowed the deduction.'
The argument that the payments in the instant case are similar to
interest payments is about as persuasive as the comparison to commissions,
but neither argument penetrates the real problem. The payments-fordividends are unique to the short sale situation and the determination of
whether they are expenses or capital charges should be considered sui
9. U. S. Treas. Reg. 33, art. 8, 108 (1917). "Expense-Commissions PaidCommissions paid in purchasing and selling securities are a part of the cost or selling
price of the securities and not otherwise deductible. They do not constitute expense
deductions in a return of income."
10. See Helvering v. Union Pacific Co., 293 U. S. 282, 286 (1934) ; Helvering v.
Spreckels, supra note 7.
11. 1922-24: I. T. 1764, 1H-2 Cum. BULL. 1065 (1925).
12. 1925: S. M. 4281, IV-2 Cum. BULL. IV-44, 2424 (1926).
13. 29 B. T. A. 44 (1933), aff'd inem., 71 F. 2d 1017 (C. C. A. 2d 1934).
14. 29 B. T. A. 125 (1933).
15. See Harriman National Bank v. Commissioner, 43 F. 2d 950, 952 (C. C. A. 2d
1930) for a discussion of "dealer."
16. Dart v. Commissioner, 74 F. 2d 845 (C. C. A. 4th 1935).
17. INT. REv. CODE § 23 (a) (2).
18. Deputy v. Dupont, 103 F. 2d 257 (C. C. A. 3d 1939) (after re-analysis of the
facts, the Supreme Court, 308 U. S. 488 (1940), determined that the taxpayer was not
in the business of trading in securities and reversed, though the Dartcase, supranote 16,
was apparently cited with approval) ; Smith v. Commissioner, 44 B. T. A. 104 (1941) ;
Wiesler v. Commissioner, 6 T. C. 1148 (1946), aff'd, 4 CCH 1947 FED. TAX REP.
1 9278 (C. C. A. 6th 1947) and memorandum opinions cited therein. The following
cases are distinguishable in that the taxpayer was found not to be in the business of
trading: Deputy v. Dupont, supra; duPont v. Commissioner, 110 F. 2d 641 (C. C. A.
3d 1940) ; Helvering v. Wilmington Trust Co., 124 F. 2d 156 (C. C. A. 3d 1941),
rev'd on other grounds, 316 U. S. 164 (1942). Though both the instant case and the
Wiesler case, supra, cite the Wilninngton case, supra, as contra, it is distinguishable
and the Levis case, supra note 8 at 797, so considered it.
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generis.19 There appear to be no important policies dictating a subservient
decision, but it may be noted that the instant decision is in accord with a
turn towards liberality, by both the legislature 2 0 and the judiciary, 21 in
allowing expenses incurred in the production of income.

Income Taxation-Cost Basis of Lessee's Improvements in the
Hands of the Lessor-Estoppel-Petitioner leased a tract of land for
99 years in 1924 and, when the lessee defaulted in 1929, repossessed the
property along with an apartment house erected on it in accordance with
the lease. No income was reported from the transaction, nor was the
manner of acquisition of the building revealed until 1938 when the petitioner sold it and computed a capital gain by including $40,000 in her cost
basis as the depreciated fair market value of the apartment house in 1929.
The commissioner disallowed the inclusion of this $40,000 as a part of
petitioner's cost and the tax court sustained the resulting deficiency.' On
appeal the decision was affirmed, the circuit court ruling: (1) the cost
basis of the building was zero; and (2) even if it were not zero the petitioner's failure to report income upon its acquisition precludes her from
asserting a higher basis now that the statute of limitations has barred a
reassessment for 1929. Johnson v. Commissioner, 162 F. 2d 844 (C. C. A.
5th 1947).
In view of Helvering v. Bruun 2 in which the Supreme Court at long
last resolved existing confusion as to when the lessee's improvements should
be taxed as income to the lessor,3 by ruling that they were taxable at the
time of reversion, the first conclusion of the instant decision comes as
something of a surprise. The rationale of the Braun case appears to establish that the cost basis of such improvements in the hands of the lessor is
the same as the amount construed as income when the reversion takes
place, i. e. their fair market value. 4 The court in the instant case implies
19. The payments appear to be a part of the cost of the stock to the extent that
they are necessary to fulfill the contract by which the short seller obtained the use of
the stock. But is the borrowing-contract.a part of the real capital transaction or only
incident to it? On the other hand, the manner of the accounting for the loan seems to
indicate that the payments are expenses. The broker charges the short seller for any
dividends declared on the stocks loaned and credits him with the interest on the money
deposited with himself, the account being adjusted periodically without regard to the
termination of the short sale.
20. Diamond, Allowance of Deductions for Non-Trade or Non-Business Expenses
in NYU TuIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 241, 245 (1945).
21. Diamond, Current Decisions on Non-Trade or Non-Business Deductions in
NYU FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 722, 725 (1946).
1. 7 T. C. 465 (1946). Judges Hill, Van Fossan, and Disney dissented as to the
point reviewed in this comment. Judge Opper dissented on a subsidiary issue.
2. 309 U. S. 461 (1940).
3. As pointed out by the government in M. E. Blatt Co. v. United States, 305 U. S.
267 (1938), such improvements could be taxed at any one of three separate stages in
the transaction: (a) when they are completed by the lessee, (b) when they revert to
the lessor, or (c) when they are sold by the lessor. By the time of the Brum case
official opinion as expressed by treasury regulations and the lower federal courts had
gone full cycle in picking one of the three alternatives as the proper time for taxation.
See Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U. S. 461 (1940) at pages 465 and 466 for a review of
these conflicting decisions. Section 115 of the Revenue Act of 1942; 56 STAT. 798, 812;
26 U. S. C. § 22(b) (11), § 113(c) makes the time of taxation once again the time of
sale and probably influenced the court in the instant case.
4. If the lessor does receive income at the reversion then it must be invested in the
building since that is the only actual increase to his holdings. See dissenting opinion
of Hill, J., in instant case in the Tax Court, 7 T. C. 465 (1946) at 478.
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that this is so only when the lessor is in fact taxed on the reacquisition of
the property in each particular situation.5 Such a ruling is broader in
effect than is necessary for the decision, 6 runs contrary to authority on
point in another circuit,7 and to some extent at least clashes with wellestablished theory that income must be taxed in the year it occurs. 8 Indeed,
the opinion's subsequent indication that if petitioner had waived the statute
of limitations a different result would have been reached 9 suggests that
the court itself doubted the overall validity of its first conclusion, and that
the real basis for the decision was the alternate holding of equitable
estoppel.10
Because of the conflict of precedent " and policy 12 concerning the use
of this latter doctrine as a device for circumventing the statute of limitations in tax cases and the fact that legislative enactment 13 now makes such
circumvention less vital to the government than formerly,' 4 the court was
5. Instant case at 846. "Since the value was not then or since taken into the tax
account as a capital investment, there is no occasion to add it to the basis of the property when sold to avoid taxing it a second time." The implication seems to be a substantive holding that unless the prior tax has actually been paid and accepted by the
commissioner the cost basis of the improvements is zero, regardless of who caused the
failure of payment or whether the statute of limitations has run on the year of reversion.
6. As indicated later in the comment the result could have been reached solely on
the application of equitable estoppel. "
. 7. Greenwood Packing Plant v. Commissioner, 131 F. 2d 787 (C. C. A. 4th 1942),
holding, in an identical fact situation where the statute of limitations did not bar a reassessment for the year of reversion, that the cost basis was the fair market value.
8. See Greenwood Packing Plant v. Commissioner, supra note 7, where after
quoting a long dictum from Burnet v. Sanford and Brooks Co., 282 U. S. 359, 363, 365
(1931) the court goes on to state at page 790: "In conformity with this rule, neither
the taxpayer nor the Commissioner in the pending case had any choice as to the year
for the imposition of the tax upon gain received by the lessor. . . . The force of this
conclusion is emphasized when it is perceived that the Commissioner's contention would
permit the taxpayer to defer the payment of the tax on the income until the sale of the
property takes place, and then calculate the tax under the different rate applicable to
capital gains."
9. Instant case at 846.
10. Even Detroit Edison v. Commissioner, 319 U. S. 98 (1943), relied on by the
court to some extent as authority for its substantive holding that the cost basis is zero
in the instant case, does not in fact control. The method of acquisition of the lines
sought to be depreciated there was contribution by customers. Such acquisition, unlike
reversion of improved property, has never been treated as taxable income. See Liberty Light and Power Co., 4 B. T. A. 155 (1925) ; acquiescence in I. T. 3279, VI-26
Cum. BULL. 4 (1927).
11. Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U. S. 106 (1936), contains a strong dictum rejecting equitable estoppel in a similar case (p. 109). Despite the implications of this opinion, most of the circuits invoke the doctrine consistently where there has not been a
full disclosure of the facts to the commissioner. See cases collected at page 112 of
Commissioner v. Saltonstall, 124 F. 2d 110 (C. C. A. 1st 1941). Some go even further
and, labeling their theory "consistency" or "election," hold that the taxpayer is precluded from a later change of position after the statute has run, even though the commission's agent was well advised of the original transaction, e. g., Orange Securities
Corporation v. Commissioner, 131 F. 2d 662 (C. C. A. 5th 1942).
The second circuit has refused to apply the theory in either situation. See Bennett
v. Helvering, 137 F. 2d 537, 539 (C. C. A. 2d 1943), and McCullough v. Commissioner,
153 F. 2d 345, 347 (C. C. A. 2d 1946).
12. The argument that as used the doctrine is only equitable if the statute of
limitations be considered inequitable is well made in Bennett v. Helvering, 137 F. 2d
537 (C. C. A. 2d 1943). On the other hand, Mertens, in 10 LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION, § 57.02, 144 (1943), referring to the statute of limitations, says: "In perhaps no other single phase of the income tax acts does a tendency to favor the taxpayer
involve inherently such dangerous potential consequences to the public treasury."
13. 52 STAT. 581, c. 289, § 820 (1938) ; 26 U. S. C. 3801.
14. The amendment would probably toll the statute for situations like that in the
instant case, if the reversion took place after 1932, see Greenwood Packing Plant
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understandably hesitant in resting its holding squarely on this theory. On
the other hand, the greatest logical difficulty usually present in its application, viz., that failure to report income is actually a representation of no
income on which the commissioner relies, 15 is here mitigated by the fact
that treasury regulations in effect in 1929 required the reversion to be
reported and taxed at that time. 16 Thus the instant case is an ideal one
in which to invoke estoppel, and it is regrettable that the court did not
base its apparently equitable decision on this ground alone.

Income Taxation-Exemption of Research Foundation Notwithstanding Payments of Revenue to Individual Not Connected With
the Foundation-Testator, an authority and pioneer in ceramic manufacturing in the United States, left his business to certain trustees for the
purposes of producing ceramic molds and of carrying on research in the
ceramic arts. In order to prevent disarrangement of foundation assets, he
expressed the wish that his widow take by will, in lieu of dower, the remaining estate plus a $42,000 bequest payable from trust earnings over a
five year period. As a condition of electing to take by will, the widow
secured an agreement by the trustees to pay her also a life annuity of $350
per month, the payments to be chargeable against all foundation assets.
Besides manufacturing, the foundation has maintained fellowships and its
own research staff, and has sponsored gratuitous publications of informative
articles. The benefits of these services, although available to all, were used
mostly by ceramic manufacturers and artisans. The foundation's claim of
exemption from income tax as a scientific and educational institution was
disallowed by the Commissioner, but the Tax Court (five judges dissenting) reversed under § 101 (6) of the Internal Revenue Code.1 Edward
Orton, Jr. Ceramic Foundation v. Commissioner, CCH TAx CT. REP.
(REG.) Dec. 16032 (1947).
The effect of this exemption clause is not entirely clear, nor are the
tests of nature of activity and scope of benefit uniformly applied.2 Genv. Commissioner, 131 F. 2d 787, 790 (C. C. A. 4th 1942), but would not cover every
case where estoppel is now used, Note, 52 H~av. L. Rxv. 300 (1938).
15. It is felt that the more or less blanket distinction between silence and dis-

closure in many jurisdictions is somewhat fallacious because silence in some circumstances, e. g., when the regulations then in force do not call for taxation at that time,
is no representation whatsoever, despite the fact that there has been no final ruling on
the law. In such a situation it is rather the commissioner who has misled the taxpayer. For comment to this effect, see MAGiLL, TAXABLE INCOME 189 (Rev. ed. 1945).
16. U. S. Treas. Reg. 74, § 63 (1929).
1. "The following organizations shall be exempt from taxation under this chapter-

"Corporations and any . . . foundation . . . operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational purposes . . . no part of the net
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private . . . individual ..
The fact that the foundation takes the form of a trust does not bar exemption.
See James Sprunt Benevolent Trust v. Commissioner, 20 B. T. A. 19, 24 (1930).
2. The treasury regulations practically restate the exemption clause and are of
little help. U. S. Treas. Reg. 45, § 231 (1918). As to the restriction against individual
benefit, compare Scholarship Endowment Foundation v. Nicholas, 106 F. 2d 552 (C. C.
A. 10th 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 623 (1939), with Lederer v. Stockton, 260 U. S. 3
(1922). As to what may be a charity, compare the attitude of the court in Colonial
Trust Company v. Commissioner, 19 B. T. A. 174, 180 (1930) with that taken in
American Society of Cinematographers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 B. T. A. 675 (1940).
See also cases cited note 7 infra.
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erally the courts have tended to construe the section broadly in order to
3
In so doing, they have often disreencourage charitable contributions.
4
and have evolved a test for exemption
statute
of
the
garded the language
5
Where income has been used
based on the destination of net income.
been derived from business, incihad
it
that
fact
the
for favored purposes,
6
dentally or in active competition, has not been held fatal to exemption.
be
may
exemption
avoidance,
tax
of
a
danger
is
there
However, where
denied by strict enforcement of the statutory restrictions, such 7as that
against the inuring of earnings to the benefit of private individuals.
Despite some inconsistent language, the instant will, as a whole, establishes beyond cavil the testator's ultimate purpose of fostering advancement
in the ceramic arts.8 However, the payments made to the widow by the
foundation presented a serious threat to exemption. As regards the bequest, if it were paid out of the estate before organization of the trust, it
clearly would not affect the nature of the foundation. Since the method
of payment actually employed results in substantially the same diminution
of trust property, there seems to be little reason for changing the status
0
of the foundation. 9 Nor should the life annuity 1 bar exemption because
it is really not a distribution of net income inasmuch as the widow herself
extracted it as the price of permitting the trust to operate free of her dower
claims." Hence, it would seem to be more in the nature of an expense
rather than a distribution of net income. The validity of the decision,
3. See Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U. S. 144, 150, 151 (1934) ; Trinidad v. Sagrada
Orden, 263 U. S. 578, 581 (1924). However, some courts have strictly construed the
section despite the general policy of favoring charities. See Scholarship Endowment
Foundation v. Nicholas, 106 F. 2d 552, 553 (C. C. A. 10th 1939) ; Producers' Creamery Company v. United States, 55 F. 2d 104, 106 (C. C. A. 5th 1932).
4. See Bok v. McCaughn, 42 F. 2d 616, 618, 619 (C. C. A. 3d 1930) ; 25 CORN. L.
Q. 634, 636 (1940).
5. See Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 263 U. S. 578, 581 (1924); Roche's Beach,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F. 2d 776 (C. C. A. 2d 1938).
6. Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 263 U. S. 578 (1924); Sand Springs Home v.
Commissioner, 6 B. T. A. 198 (1927) ; Appeal of Unity School of Christianity, 4 B. T.
A. 61 (1926).
7. See note 1 supra. Northern Illinois College of Optometry, 12 P-H T. C.
But cf. Home Oil Mill v. Willingham, 68 F. Supp. 525
MEm. DEC. 143,396 (1943).
(S. D. Ala. 1946). Though not apparent from the opinion, the court may have been
influenced by this precaution in James Sprunt Benevolent Trust v. Commissioner, 20
B. T. A. 19 (1930). But cf. Baker, Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 B. T. A. 555 (1939).
The practical difficulty which is sometimes encountered in determining the presence
of tax avoidance is illustrated by the majority and dissenting opinion in Havermeyer
v. Commissioner, 98 F. 2d 706 (C. C. A. 2d 1938).
8. The will stated, "It is my intention to provide an organization, not for profit,
whose real or ultimate objects are altruistic, and wholly devoted to producing industrial, scientific and social betterments. . . . The surplus produced by the . . . organization . . . shall be expended by the Research Organization whose product is
knowledge, given free to all who are interested." [Brief for petitioners, p. 36.]
9. Even where the charge was an annuity, it has s6metimes been held not to affect
the status of the exempt organization. Baker, Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 B. T. A. 555
(1939). This point is subject to the caveat that the charge imposed must not constitute such a great proportion of the assets or income of the estate as to negative the
charitable nature of the organization. See Putnam v. Commissioner, 6 T. C. 702, 707
(1946).
10. Where payments of annuities were pre-arranged by the benefactor and not,
as in the instant case, made at the instance of the beneficiary, they have usually been
held fatal to exemption. Scholarship Endowment Foundation v. Nicholas, 106 F. 2d
552 (C. C. A. 10th 1939) ; James Sprunt Benevolent Trust v. Commissioner, 20 B. T.
A. 19 (1930). But cf. Lederer v. Stockton, 260 U. S. 3 (1922) ; Mallery v. Commissioner, 40 B. T. A. 78 (1939).
11. See note 10 supra.
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however, depends also on whether or not the benefits of ceramic research
are sufficiently beneficial to the public to justify encouragement by tax
exemption. 12 The court's attitude in this respect is indicative of a trend
toward further liberalizing the concept 3of a charitable institution as covered
by the exemption section of the Code.'

International Law-Jurisdiction of the Courts of the United
States to Review the Validity of Official Acts of a Foreign Nation
Done Within Its Own Territory-Plaintiff alleged that he owned all
of the shares of stock in a German corporation and that by means of duress
Nazi officials compelled him to transfer all the stock to a Nazi designee.
In an action for conversion of a ship belonging to his corporation, plaintiff
contended that the defendant, a Belgian corporation, had acquired it from
the designee with notice of the duress. The district court's order quashing
a warrant of attachment of a debt owed the defendant and dismissing the
complaint was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. It was held that
United States courts could not adjudicate the validity of the official acts
of another government done within its own territory, unless the Executive
has acted to relieve the courts of their disability. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen
Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F. 2d 246 (C. C. A. 2d 1947).1
The problem in the instant case is a novel one: the court is asked to
decide that the Executive has made pronouncements retroactively invalidatwar with
ing the official acts of another government where an intervening
2
It has long
the United States has rendered that government defunct.
been held that ".

.

. the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on

the acts of another done within its own territory . . ." 3 The language
of Supreme Court decisions indicates that the doctrine is rationalized on
the theory of comity between nations 4 which confines claimants to whatever redress may be offered in that other country.5 It is likewise well
12. The terms employed to describe a charity are necessarily general. For a typical
definition, see Missouri Historical Society v. Academy of Science, 94 Mo. 459, 466, 8
S. W. 346, 348 (1888), quoted in United States v. Proprietors of Social Law Library,
102 F. 2d 481, 483 (C. C. A. 1st 1939). See also 3 ScoTT ON TRuSTS § 374 (1939)
for the factors involved in determining charitable status.
13. In American Society of Cinematographers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 B. T. A.
675 (1940), a non-profit association whose membership was restricted to first cameramen, with admission by invitation only, and which was organized for the purpose of
fostering exchange of technical information among the members only and for paying
death benefits to members, was brought within the exemption clause. But see Colonial
Trust Company v. Commissioner, 19 B. T. A. 174, 180 (1930) for an earlier treatment
of an organization with comparable purposes.
1. Certiorari denied, 68 Sup. Ct. 88 (1947).
2. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said that persons should
be allowed to rely on official acts of the deposed Loyalist Government in Spain even
though the succeeding Franco government requested that such acts be given no effect.
Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F. 2d 438 (C. C. A. 2d 1940).
3. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250, 252 (1897). See also Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297 (1918) ; Luther v. James Sagor & Co., [1921] 3 K. B. 532.
4. "To permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign State to be re-examined
and perhaps condemned by the courts of another would very certainly 'imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of nations.'" Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., supra note 3, at 304. See also Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U. S.
304, 308-310 (1918); United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324, 328 (1937); United
States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203 (1942).
5. Cf. Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn Gesellschaft, 290 N. Y. Supp. 181, 194-196
(1936). A victim of confiscation would have little standing in the courts of the country which confiscated his property.
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the courts look to the
established that with regard to international affairs,
political branch of the government for guidance.6
In order to arrive at a proper solution many practical considerations
have to be weighed. If this claim is permitted to go to trial, the way will
be cleared for the vast number of refugee claims for restitution arising out8
of German confiscations 7 which established courts are ill-equipped to hear.
Further complications issue from the division of Germany by the Allies
into military zones.9 In addition, some final settlement might necessarily
involve the Belgian government. 10 On the other side is the realization that
restitution through reparations channels is problematical." It would seem
only fair that the Belgian transferee, could its culpability be proved at the
trial, should bear the risks involved in reparation recovery, rather than the
innocent plaintiff. Mere difficulties of adjudication should not prevent this
cause from being tried in an American court which has jurisdiction over
property and persons. Manifestly, this is a situation involving international
and political problems and logically comes within the domain of the State
Department. If it could be made clear that the Executive has acted to
invalidate Nazi confiscations 12 they should no longer remain unassailable
before our courts. 13 The best disposal of this appeal would be, as Judge
6. In general see Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts,
With regard to recognition see JAFFE, JUDICIAL
AsPcs OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 199-232 (1933); Jones v. United States, 137 U. S.
202, 212 (1890). For a recent Supreme Court view on following the lead of the State
Department in matters of international import, see Mr. Justice Frandurter's concurring opinion in Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U. S. 30, 38 (1945) ; but see Jessup, Has the
Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions., 40 Am. J. INT'L L. 168 (1946).
7. This might raise the further problem of discrimination on claims, i. e., that a
claimant whose confiscated property had been transferred to third parties would be
allowed to sue in American courts, while the claimant whose confiscated property was
retained by the Nazis would have to resort to reparations courts when and if established.
8. In view of the complexities peculiar to German reparation and restitution payments, such as who shall get priority, how evidence is to be obtained and presented,
and whether Germany is able to pay if the claim is allowed, it might be expedient to
have claims heard by an administrative body rather than by a court. For a r~sum6 of
reparations problems encountered after World War I, see BURNETT, REPARATION AT

8 MINN. L. REv. 485-513 (1924).

THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

(1940).

9. While the plaintiff's property was confiscated in the British zone, the British
apparently have not yet set up a system for restitution in their zone. N. Y. Times,
November 11, 1947, p. 24, col. 1.
10. Judge Learned Hand discussed the possibility that upon an adverse judgment
here the Belgian government would prosecute a reparations claim on behalf of the corporation. Instant case at 251.
11. See statement by State and War Department officials made upon the publication of Military Government Law No. 59, reported in N. Y. Times, November 11,
1947, p. 24, col. 1. See also Directive to Commander-in-Chief of U. S. Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government in Germany, July 11, 1947, 17 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 186, 190 (1947).
12. See Art. III.A. 4 of Anglo-Soviet-American Conference Berlin, 1945 Joint
Report (Excerpts), and published in THE Axis IN DEFEAT (U. S. Dep't State 1945)
at 12. "All Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler regime or established
discrimination on grounds of race, creed or political opinion shall be abolished. No
such discrimination whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated."
See also Directive to Commander-in-Chief of U. S. Forces of Occupation, srupra note
11. The sanction of the Executive at the Nuremberg trials would seem further to indicate the invalidity of Nazi acts within Germany.
13. A strong indictment of German discriminatory decrees was made by the court
in Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn Gesellschaft, 290 N. Y. S. 181, 194-96 (1936), modified, 277 N. Y. 474, 14 N. E. 2d 798 (1938) ; cf. David v. Veitscher M. A. G., 348 Pa.
335, 35 A. 2d 346 (1944).
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Clark in his dissent suggests, to send the case back to the trial judge instructing him to ask the State Department for a definition of Executive
policy in these matters. 14
Labor Law-Decision of National Railway Adjustment Board
Binding in Subsequent Court Action-Plaintiff had entered into
a written contract with the defendant railroad to perform janitorial
functions as an "independent contractor" at a wage lower than that provided for in an existing agreement between the railroad and the union
representing its station employees. Five years later, the union filed a
claim on behalf of the plaintiff under the Railway Labor Act to recover
the difference between the plaintiff's actual wages and what he would have
received under the union agreement. Eventually the claim was submitted
to the National Railway Adjustment Board which found that it had jurisdiction of the dispute. The Board rejected the railroad's contention that
the plaintiff was outside the Board's jurisdiction as not being an "employee"
within the meaning of the Act but decided that the plaintiff had no rights
under the union-employer agreement. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a
similar claim in the district court.' On appeal, summary judgment for the
railroad was affirmed on the ground that the Board's decision was final. 2
Hargis v. Wabash R. R., 163 F. 2d 608 (C. C. A. 7th 1947).
It appears that the Board erred in denying relief in the instant case
as the contract signed by the plaintiff was clearly a subterfuge on the part
of the railroad to evade the consequences of the union agreement. 3 The
power to enter into individual contracts is inconsistent with collective bargaining agreements.4 Nevertheless, the court in the instant proceedings
appears to have been without power to remedy the error of the Board.
The Railway Labor Act 5 ,provides: "The awards of the . . . Adjustment
Board shall be . . . final and binding upon both parties to the dispute,

except insofar as they shall contain a money award . . ." ' Under the
terms of the statute, no sound basis is evident upon which a court may
look into substantive questions decided by the Board when a petitioner has
been denied relief by the Board and then seeks judicial action. While one
court has hinted that the absence of a money award in a decision denying
14. Conceivably the State Department might refuse to take a definite stand as to
what the Executive policy is. Instant case at 253; cf. Compania Espanola De Navegacion Maritima, S. A. v. The Navemar, 303 U. S. 68, 71 (1938); II HACKWORTH,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 449 (1941).
However, this should not be reason for
not at least approaching the State Department for an answer.
1. Plaintiff's claim also contained a second count requesting compensation and
damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
2. The granting of summary judgment for the railroad on the second count was
reversed on the ground that the plaintiff had the status of an employee within the
meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act and was therefore entitled to recover.
3. [Brief for Appellant, pp. 2, 3.] Plaintiff's contract provided that he would assume all liability for loss, property damage or personal injury caused by his agents or
servants. The plaintiff never had or needed an assistant in his janitorial duties. He
was generally treated as an employee and told what hours he should work and often
ran errands for the station agent. He worked seven days a week, totaling approximately forty-eight hours, for which he received $35 a month.
4. See Dierschow v. West Suburban Dairies, Inc., 276 Ill. App. 355 (1934);
Gulla v. Barton, 164 App. Div. 293, 149 N. Y. Supp. 952 (3d Dep't 1914).
5. 44 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. (1940).
6. 44 STAT. 578 (1926), as amended, 48 STAT. 1189 (1934), 45 U. S. C. § 153(m)
(1940).
7. See dissent of Mr. Justice Franldurter in Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325
U. S.711, 760 (1945).
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relief might not bar subsequent judicial action,8 the majority of courts

have refused to act in these cases.9 Indeed, any construction of the statute,
whereby petitioner could bring a later action, would of necessity be somewhat forced.
It is true that courts have upheld collateral attacks on judgments of
the Board not involving a money award where it has been shown that the
Board had no jurisdiction of the dispute.' 0 But in none of these cases was
the attack upon the award of the Board made by parties who had originally
sought the jurisdiction of the Board as did the plaintiff here." While the
Board may have been inconsistent in finding that the plaintiff was an
"employee" for the purpose of determining that it had jurisdiction but that
he was an "independent contractor" in his relationship to the union agreement,' 2 a court reversing the award on the basis of the Board's lack of
jurisdiction and giving judgment for the plaintiff would be involved in a
similar inconsistency. In view of the considerable hardship that may be
caused by cases of this sort, some modification in the statute, providing for
at least limited judicial review of the Board's decisions, seems desirable.

Liens-Pennsylvania Statute Provides Factors With a Lien on
Merchandise Remaining in the Possession of the Borrower-Pennsylvania, by enacting the Factor's Lien Act,' has adopted a simplified method
of inventory financing giving the lender a lien on merchandise without
taking possession. In providing a workable means of financing for the
manufacturer, processor, or retailer, whose only possible collateral may be
material-in-process or a small but constantly changing inventory, the Act
eliminates many of the disadvantages of chattel mortgages, trust receipts,
and field warehousing. For example, the merchandise may remain in the
8. ". . . the question is not before us whether an employee can maintain a suit
for relief independent of the statute and the award, after he has submitted his case to
the Board and received its adverse decision. That the statute . . . might be invalid
as to the employee and that he might therefore have independent relief, does not mean
that it would be invalid as to the carrier or that it should have such relief from the
Board's adverse decision." Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 124 F. 2d 235, 245
(App. D. C. 1941).
9. Burke v. Union Pac. R. R., 129 F. 2d 844 (C. C. A. 10th 1942) ; Berryman v.
Pullman Co., 48 F. Supp. 542 (W. D. Mo. 1942); Williams v. Atchison, T. & S. F.
Ry., 3 CCH LABOR LAW SERv. 64,012 (1947).
10. Stephenson v. New Orleans & N. E. R. R., 180 Miss. 147, 177 So. 509 (1937);
Watson v. Missouri Kansas Texas R. R., 173 S.W. 2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
Contra: Railroad Yardmasters of North America, Inc. v. Pittsburgh & L. E. R. R.,
39 F. Supp. 876 (N. D. Ohio 1940).
11. In the instant case, the nature of the plaintiff's duties and his compensation
came to the attention of the union, which filed a protest. The claim progressed pursuant to the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, culminating in the Board proceedings. The railroad contended that the Board lacked jurisdiction of the dispute in that
the plaintiff was an "independent contractor" and therefore not an "employee" as required for the Board's jurisdiction to be exercised. In the subsequent court proceedings, the railroad claimed that the Board had properly exercised its jurisdiction, while
the plaintiff contended that it had not.
12. The Board found "that the carrier and the employee involved in this dispute
are respective 'carrier' and 'employee' within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act

as approved June 21, 1934." Instant case at 610. The Board stated elsewhere in its
opinion: "It will be readily seen that Hargis not being an employee can have no rights
under the clerk's agreement." [Brief for Appellant, p. 31.]
1. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 6, §§ 221-229 (Purdon, Supp. 1947). Similar statutes are
found in Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York and twelve other states.
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possession of the borrower, 2 eliminating the necessary loss 3of possession
in field warehousing.
and control of the merchandise inherent
The Act allows the factor 4 a lien, if so provided in a written agreement, for an indefinite length of time on such raw, in-process, or finished
inventory intended for sale, as may be designated, from time to time, by
the borrower.5 Chattel mortgages, on the other hand, entail formalities
of preparation and execution; 6 and the lien obtained, unless extended by7
filing an affidavit, is effective against third parties for only five years.
Furthermore, the factor's lien permits the lender to extend credit indefinitely in both point of time and amount, securing all past and future obligations chargeable against the borrower; 8 whereas the chattel mortgage
secures only those future advances, not exceeding in aggregate the amount
stated in the mortgage, made within five years of its execution; 9 and a
trust receipt, only those obligations for which the chattels were security
before the trust receipt transaction or those agreed upon at the time of the
transaction.' 0
The factor's lien affords both past and potential creditors of the borrower protection by requiring adequate notice. A notice that the lender
has been designated "factor" must be posted on the premises where the
merchandise is stored,11 and one describing the general character 12 of the
with the prothonotary of each county where the
merchandise must be filed
merchandise is stored.' 3 Problems may arise as to the description necessary
under the wording of the Act, but it is evident that the required description
2. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 6, §222 (Purdon, Supp. 1947). The New York Act has
been so interpreted. N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW (McKinney, Supp. 1947) § 45,
In re Comet Textile Co., 15 F. Supp. 963 (S.D. N. Y. 1936), aff'd 91 F. 2d 1008 (C.
C. A. 2d 1937).
3. American Can Co. v. Erie Preserving Co., 183 F. 96 (C. C. A. 2d 1910) ; Bank
v. Jagode, 186 Pa. 556, 40 Atl. 1018 (1898).
housing, see JACOBY

AND

SAULNIER,

For a general discussion of field ware-

FINANCING INVENTORY

ON FIELD WAREHOUSE

(1944).
4. "Factor" as defined by the Act includes, "A person, firm, partnership, bank, or
corporation and their successors in interest, that lends or advances money on the secuREcEIPTs

rity of merchandise, whether or not employed to sell such merchandise." PA. STAT.
ANN., tit. 6, § 221 (Purdon, Supp. 1947). At common law a factor was an agent having possession of his principal's goods for the purpose of sale. Philadelphia National
Bank v. Pennsylvania Warehousing & Safe Deposit Co., 141 Pa. 517, 21 Atl. 651
(1891) ; BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 520 (1936).
5. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 6, § 222 (Purdon, Supp. 1947).
6. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 940.2 (Purdon, Supp. 1947). Note, The Chattel Mortgage Act of June 1, 1945, 50 DICK. L. REv. 72 (1946).
7. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 940.13 (Purdon, Supp. 1947).
8. See note 5 supra.
STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 940.4 (Purdon, Supp. 1947).
10. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 68, § 564 (Purdon, Supp. 1947). Pennsylvania recognized
trust receipts in Brown Bros. & Co. v. Billington, 163 Pa. 76, 29 Atl. 904 (1894).
Note, The Uniform Trust Receipts Act in Pennsylvania, 16 TEMP. L. Q. 208 (1942) ;
Note, The Effect of the Trust Receipts Act on Chattel Mortgages in Pennsylvania, 18
TEMP. L. Q. 406 (1944).
11. See note 5 supra.
12. The notice must also include the name and principal place of business of both
the factor and the borrower. See note 5 supra. In trust receipts, only a statement of
intention to engage in trust receipt transactions must be filed, not the individual transactions. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 68, § 563 (Purdon, Supp. 1947).
13. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 6, § 223 (Purdon, Supp. 1947).

9. PA.
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need not be as detailed as that in a chattel mortgage.' 4 If, however, the
factor has possession of the merchandise, he acquires a lien without filing
or posting the usual notices. 15 The title of § 6 16 of the Act, "Common
Law Lien" is thus a misnomer. If the factor has possession but fails to
file the notice with the prothonotary, § 6 expressly extends to him the
general lien provided in § 2 without establishing a common law factor's
lien. 17
Section 4 of the Act protects the lender, as the lien is effective against
all unsecured claims and subsequent liens of creditors, although it is not
effective against subsequent statutory liens incurred by the borrower in
preparing the merchandise for sale.' 8 In contrast to a chattel mortgage,'"
§ 4 provides that subsequent purchasers take free and clear of the lien
which attaches to any proceeds of the sale and is effective against subsequent purchasers, assignees, transferees, pledgees and other creditors of
the borrower. 20 Judicial interpretation may be necessary to determine the
exact priority of liens under § 4, and whether "proceeds" includes accounts
receivable. If the latter term is included, difficulties are inherent concerning the conditions necessary for the lien to shift from the accounts
receivable to the merchandise,
where the lender sells, on credit, merchandise
21
that is later returned.
The Factor's Lien Act is consistent with the law in Pennsylvania governing chattel financing. 22 The widest use of this method of inventory
financing may be expected to arise where a small processor, manufacturer,
14. "Property covered . . . by any such chattel mortgage may be described as
all that property of a specified class so identified by reference to location, brands,
marks, numbers or otherwise as to distinguish it from other property of the same
class." PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 940.2 (Purdon, Supp. 1947).
15. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 6, § 226 (Purdon, Supp. 1947).
16. Ibid.
17. At common law, a factor to be entitled to a general lien was required to have
possession of the merchandise and power of selling it. Irving Trust Co. v. B. Lindner
& Bros., 264 N. Y. 165, 190 N. E. 332 (1934) ; BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROP-

523 (1936). The Irving Trust Co. case, supra, held that under the New York
Factor's Lien Act of 1931, Laws of New York 1931, c. 766, the factor having possession of the merchandise must file the required notice or must establish a common
law factor's lien. The Act was subsequently amended, Laws of New York 1935, c.
690, redefining factor to include consignees or pledgees whether or not employed to
sell the pledged or consigned merchandise. This is substantially the definition in the
Pennsylvania Act. See note 4 supra.
18. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 6, § 224 (Purdon, 1947). This is an extension of the
New York Act, N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW (McKinney, Supp. 1947), § 45, which
is effective only against "claims of creditors." Chattel mortgages are effective against
all subsequent liens. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 940.5 (Purdon, Supp. 1947).
19. In the absence of a written agreement to the contrary between the mortgagor
and mortgagee, a subsequent purchaser acquires the chattel subject to the lien. PA.
STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 940.6 (Purdon, Supp. 1947).
20. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 6, § 224 (Purdon, Supp. 1947).
21. The New York Act expressly includes accounts receivable as being subject to
the lien. N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW (McKinney, Supp. 1947), § 45. Returned
goods, not kept separate from the borrower's general stock, were not "proceeds resulting from a sale of merchandise." Bloch v. Mill Factors Corp., 119 F. 2d 536 (C.
C. A. 2d 1941).
22. Distinguishing bailment leases from conditional sales, Rowe v. Sharp, 51 Pa.
26 (1865), offered partial relief from the rule expressed in Martin v. Mathiot, 14 S. &
R. 214 (Pa. 1826), that conditional sales with the title remaining in the vendor were
void as against execution creditors of the vendee in possession. Pennsylvania recognized the trust in 1894. Brown Bros. & Co. v. Billington, 163 Pa. 76, 29 At. 904
(1894). A comprehensive chattel mortgage act was adopted in 1945. PA. STAT.
ANN., tit. 21, § 940.1 et seq. (Purdon, Supp. 1947).
ERTY
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or retailer needs working capital, but his fixed assets are already encumbered; his financial statements do not provide an adequate basis for the
extension of credit; and his inventory is so small that all of it must be
available for further processing or for display on his shelves for sale. Implicit faith of the lender in the integrity of the borrower is a prerequisite
for this method of chattel financing, and the factor's lien will not supplant
chattel mortgages, trust receipts, and field warehousing where long term
financing or stringent control by the lender over the merchandise is desired.

Sealed Agreement of Sale-Want of Consideration-Statute Declared Valid and Controlling After Lower Court Ruled It Unconstitutional-A statute providing that a fiduciary's obligation to perform a
contract for the sale of assets should not be relieved by receipt of a better
offer, unless the parties so agreed,' was declared unconstitutional by the
Orphans' Court of Allegheny County. Some months later, a sale of trust
property to S was authorized by that same court. In a sealed agreement
of sale signed after the court approval, Trustee reserved a right to revoke
if a higher bid was received. Before settlement, X made a higher offer and
the Orphans' Court ordered sale to him. When the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania reversed the Orphans' Court and declared the statute to be
constitutional, 2 S appealed from the order of sale to X. The Supreme
Court (three justices dissenting and one concurring) upheld S's contention
that there was no consideration to support his promise to permit Trustee
to revoke, and ordered sale to S. In re Commonwealth Trust Co. of Pittsburgh, Appeal of Shapiro, 357 Pa. 349, 54 A. 2d 649 (1947).
The traditional Pennsylvania tenet that a seal imports consideration 3
was here brushed aside in favor of an exception that where an agreement
reveals the want of consideration the rule will not be applied. 4 It is a
casehardened maxim that a pre-existing legal obligation will not support
a promise. 5 The decree of the Orphans' Court ordering the sale was interpreted as creating such an obligation, and as a result, any subsequent
promise extracted by the Trustee was purportedly unenforceable. Since
the parties apparently entered into the contract with the mistaken idea
that Trustee was obliged to accept higher offers, 6 the instant decision might
find support in the argument that an agreement founded on a mistake of
law will not be enforced. 7 Though equity courts have wide power to grant
relief when parties make an error as to controlling facts, the opposite is
1. Act of May 24, 1945, P. L. 944, §§ 1 and 2, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, §§ 818 and

819 (Purdon, Supp. 1946).
2. Brereton Estate, 355 Pa. 45, 48 A. 2d 868 (1946), commented on in 95 U. OF
PA. L. REv.220 (1946).
"When a former decision is overruled, the reconsidered pronouncement will be considered as the law from the beginning." Philadelphia v. Schaller, 148 Pa. Super. 276, 280, 25 A. 2d 406, 409 (1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 649
(1942). See also Pierce v. Pierce, 46 Ind. 86 (1874).
3. Killeen's Estate, 310 Pa. 182, 187, 165 Atl. 34, 35 (1932).
4. Instant case, 54 A. 2d at 652.
5. Tradesmen's National Bank, etc. v. Cummings Bros. Co., 306 Pa. 280, 159 Atl.
452 (1932).
6. The clause in question provided: "It is the understanding of the parties hereto
that this Agreement covers property in a Trust Estate and that the Vendor in its fiduciary capacity is legally obliged to accept any higher or better offer which it received
prior to the approval of the within sales agreement by the Orphans' Court of Allegheny County, Pa. . . ." Instant case, 54 A. 2d at 650.
7. This was the basis of a concurring opinion by Chief Justice Maxey. Instant
case, 54 A. 2d at 652.
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generally said to be true when there is a mistake of law.8 There is scant
reason for distinction, and none appeared until 1802 when Lord Ellenborough applied criminal law to an action of assumpsit. 9 The rule's hardy

survival, despite the recognition of a shaky foundation, has been suggested

as a strong argument in its favor. 10 But inconvenience, inconsistency, and
injustice have been responsible for arbitrary exceptions which have shaken
or swept away the results of Ellenborough's decision in many states,"

notably Kentucky 'land Connecticut, 13 though the courts of Pennsylvania
14

go to an extreme in denying the general exceptions to the rule.
Granting for the sake of argument that the agreement should not have
been enforced, it would seem the Court was faced with the necessity of
impairing the Pennsylvania law as to at least one of the three doctrines
involved, seal, consideration, or mistake of law, in order to set it aside.
If it decided that the seal did not supply the necessary consideration,' 5
the principle that all clauses of a contract are mutually supporting 16 still
stood in the way. The Court would thus have to tamper with the Pennsylvania dogma on seals and ignore a basic idea of written contracts. On
the other hand, the waning view on mistake of law, complete with exceptions,' 7 the abuse of legal writers,' 8 and even the vacillation of the Pennsylvania judiciary, 19 gave the Court one of three choices in this respect:
add another exception and say that where parties rely on a decision which
is subsequently overruled their contract will not be enforced; overrule past
decisions and declare that a mistake of law offers sufficient grounds for
cancellation of a contract; or ignore the mistake angle entirely. The Court
chose to ignore the mistake basis and adapted the want of consideration
view. This means the traditional rule on mistake of law has been strengthened in Pennsylvania, while the law of sealed instruments has been muddled
8. 5 WILLISTON,

CONTRAcTS 4416 (Rev. ed. 1937).
9. Bilbie v. Lumley, 2 East 469, 102 Eng. Rep. 448 (1802).
10. Note, 45 HARv. L. REv. 336 (1931).
11. Note, 32 HARv. L. REv. 283 (1919).
12. Horn v. Atlas Assurance Soc'y, 241 Ky. 226, 43 S. W. 2d 675 (1931).
13. "It is no longer true, if it ever was, that a mistake of law is no ground for
relief in any case. . . ." Park Bros. & Co. v. The Blodgett & Clapp Co., 64 Conn.
28, 33-34, 29 Atl. 133, 134 (1894).
14. "It is plainly to be seen from the foregoing cases that however the general
rule may have been criticized in the past, the courts of this state are not inclined to
depart from its enforcement for the reason, as often stated, that if ignorance or mistake
of law were generally allowed to be pleaded, 'there could be no security in legal rights,
no certainty in judicial investigations, no finality in litigations'. . . ." First Nat.
Bank of Sunbury v. Rockerfeller et al., 333 Pa. 553, 559, 5 A. 2d 205, 207 (1939).

15. Cf. ".

.

. the seal takes the place of proof of consideration and in the absence

of fraud makes the promise enforceable without it. The defense of want of consideration is not available in an action on a sealed instrument.

. .

."

Pa. 561, 563, 3 A. 2d 697, 699 (1938).
16. See Justice Stern's dissent. Instant case, 54 A. 2d at 658.
17. ".

.

Conrad's Estate, 333

. we concede that the trend of decisions in our state has been to multiply

the exceptions . . . but in each of the cases cited the relief granted was not based
solely on the ground of ignorance of the law, but there were in addition circumstances
of great hardship resulting from the ignorance, or, in addition to the mistake of law,
facts pointing strongly towards fraud or undue influence.

.

.

."

Norris v. Crowe,

206 Pa. 438, 448, 55 Atl. 1125, 1129 (1903). See also Smith, Correcting Mistakes of
Law in Texas, 9 TEx. L. REv. 309 (1931).
18. Ireton, Mistake of Law, 67 U. S. L. Rv. 405 (1933).
19. "We have examined most, if not all of the cases decided by our Supreme Court
involving this question and have found none in which relief against a gross injustice
resulting from an innocent mistake of law has not been granted where it could be
done without doing injustice to others. . . ." Price v. Shultz, 85 Pa. Super. 78, 83
(1925). See also Wilson v. Ott, 173 Pa. 253, 260-261, 34 Atl. 23, 26 (1896).
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and confused. If the Court carries its reasoning 2 0 to its logical conclusion,
it will mean that no agreement will be enforced unless consideration is
clearly shown. In other words, the seal will be without effect. Furthermore, any time a promisor wants to assert that a clause of his agreement
should not be enforced, this case will make an excellent citation.
Securities Regulation-State Approval Not Condition Precedent
to District Court Order Approving SEC Plan to Simplify Holding
Company System-The SEC petitioned for a district court order approving the application of a utility operating company for a redistribution
of the company's common shares. This plan was to effect a more equitable
distribution of voting power 1 under § 11 (e) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.2 The SEC had previously decided that the
holding company, of which this operating company is a subsidiary, was
not entitled to be exempted from the provisions of the Act, even though
the holding company system operated only within the State of New York.3
The Public Service Commission of New York intervened, claiming that
the state requirements had not been satisfied, 4 and claiming a "veto" power
in the state under § 7 (g) of the Act.5 The district court, in approving
the application, held that approval by the state commission is not a prerequisite for enforcement of the plan. In re Kings County Lighting Company, 72 F. Supp. 767 (E. D. N. Y. 1947).
A "veto" power in a state agency over a national agency operating
under the "commerce clause" 6 cannot exist 7 unless, possibly, a provision
20. "In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, an agreement under seal imports consideration. When, however, the agreement itself reveals the insufficiency or
lack of consideration, the rule will not be applied to the detriment of the promisor."
Instant case, 54 A. 2d at 652.
1. The plan provided that the holders of the old common shares would get 7'/%
of the new common shares. The holding company (Long Island Lighting Company.)
owned 97.736% of the common shares.
2. 49 STAT. 822 (1935), 15 U. S. C.§ 79k(e) (1940).

".

.

. any registered hold-

ing company or any subsidiary company of a registered holding company may . . .
submit a plan to the Commission. . . . If, after notice and opportunity for a hearing,
the Commission shall find such a plan . . . necessary to effectuate the provisions of
subsection (b) [providing for fairly and equitably distributing voting power among the
holders of outstanding securities] the Commission, at the request of the company, may
apply to a court, to enforce and carry out the terms and provisions of such plan. .. "
3. Long Island Lighting Company et al., SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 5746,
April 21, 1945. This decision was made because the Public Service Commission of
New York found itself inadequate to enforce a dismembering of this system, and because many of the shareholders lived in other states.
4. While the federal decisions evaluate the shares on a "potential earning" basis,
e. g., Group of Institutional Investors et al. v. C. M. St. P. and P. R. Co., 318 U. S.
523, 540 (1943), New York uses an "asset" basis, thus evaluating the present outstanding common shares as worthless. The difference in evaluation technique raises
the instant conflict.
5. 49 STAT. 817 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79g(g) (1940). "If a State commission or
State securities commission, having jurisdiction over any of the acts enumerated [here,
company exercising the privilege to alter voting power] shall inform the Commission,
upon request by the Commission for an opinion or otherwise, the State laws applicable
to the act in question have not been complied with, the Commission shall not permit a
declaration regarding the act in question to become effective until and unless the Commission is satisfied that such compliance has been effected."
6. The real basis of the Act is the interstate sale of a company's securities, though
it does purely an intrastate utility business.
7. This result is described by the so-called occupation of the field doctrine. Generally, the state is divested of power to the extent that Congress has occupied a particular field under the "commerce clause." For cases and development of this doctrine,
see Note, 60 HARv. L. REv. 262 (1946).
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is made in the federal Act for control over the same subject matter by the
state. Section 11 of the Act under which the SEC is empowered to effect
a redistribution is silent as to concurrent control. However, § 7 (g),
contains language to the effect that the SEC is without power to approve
the operating company's exercise of a privilege to alter voting power of
state
holders of outstanding securities in day-to-day transactions where the
8
Rehas notified the SEC that state regulations have not been obeyed.
distributions under § 11, however, are mandatory in nature, though, as
here, the company may take the first step by making application. While
possibly, therefore, the two sections were meant to be independent, § 7
"'preventive," and § 11 "remedial," the court chose to view the two sections

as interrelated, 9 deeming the "compliance with state regulations" provision
as merely suggestive to the SEC.

In reaching this conclusion, the court

leaned heavily for support upon a Supreme Court decision involving a
similar problem under the Federal Power Act of 1935.10 The reasoning
in both cases is that dual control is harmful and impossible; therefore

Congress could not have intended it."

However, Congress was assured

that the ultimate purpose of the Act was to make effective state control

possible over dismantled parts of holding company systems, and was not to
interfere with holding companies operating "only within" a state.12 But
once decided, as here, that the SEC has jurisdiction, 13 it would seem that
references to concurrent state control in the Act are operative only where
the SEC does not choose to exercise its exclusive powers.
Cooperation between state and federal agencies is to be desired because
4
Here the state is interested in the
of their varying fields of interest.'
8. H. R. REP. No. 1903, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1935) : "The Senate bill provided (sec. 7(g)) that a declaration regarding the issuance of a security shall not become effective, if subject to the jurisdiction of a state pommission . . . unless it is
shown that applicable State laws have been complied with. This provision is not contained in the House amendment. The substitute agreed to contains a provision similar
to that contained in the Senate bill, modified somewhat for the purpose of relieving
the Commission of some of the administrative burden involved." (Italics ours.) The
language of the substitute would not seem to weaken the Senate provision, but merely
place the burden upon the state of getting the evidence of non-compliance before the

SEC.
9. Perhaps the provision for state approval under § 7(g) of the Act was merely
to relieve the SEC of the burden of examining multitudinous unimportant transactions.
See Buchanan, The Public Utility Holding Company Problem, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 517,
548 (1937).
10. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. F. P. C., 328 U. S. 152 (1946)
(unnecessary for cooperative to apply for a state license where state law would forbid
the project, though Act provided for satisfaction of state requirements as a condition
precedent); § 9(b) of Federal Power Act, 41 STAT. 1068 (1920), 16 U. S. C. § 802(b)

(1940).
11. Id. at 167. "The duality of control consists merely of the division of the common enterprise between two cooperating agencies of the Government, each with final

authority in its own jurisdiction. The duality does not require two agencies to share
in the final decision of the same issue." For a criticism of the case, see Decision, 46
COL. L. REv. 837 (1946).
12. 79 CONG. REc. 8384, 8394, 8395 (1935). See also REPORT OF NATIONAL POWER
POLICY COMMITTEE, HearingsBefore Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
on H. R. 5423, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2316 (1935).
13. See note 3 supra.
14. Buchanan, The Public Utility Holding Company Problem, 25 CALIF. L. REv.
517 (1937) ; Collins, Fellowship Between Federal and State Commissions, 15 P. U.
FORT. 243 (1935) ; Foster, The Federal Power Commission and State Jurisdiction,
CONTEMPORARY LAW PAMPHLET, Series 4, No. 1 (1940).
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local consumer of services. The SEC is primarily interested in protecting
the investor.15 But where Congress provides for what seemingly is concurrent jurisdiction, the federal agency must prevail where such duality
would lead to a conflict. Otherwise, no decision at all could be made, as
the court's power is limited to approving or disapproving the plan of the
SEC in its totality. 16 The operating company would be in a difficult position until the two agencies agreed. Furthermore, uniform control of
securities by the SEC should not be frustrated in order to preserve state
control of corporations, since state control of intrastate rates will not be
impaired. But are there more subtle methods by which the state may
exercise a "veto" power? Because of the federal court order, it is to be
presumed that a mandamus proceeding will not be required to force the
issuance of an amended certificate of incorporation. 17 Could the state,
however, by quo warranto proceedings, cause the operating company to
forfeit its operating privileges on some independent ground such as "misuser," 's or refuse to renew the articles of association if the period of incorporation has expired? Or could the SEC coerce the state into allowing
the corporation to remain in existence? It is unlikely that the state would
attempt to frustrate the SEC by such indirect means as these, at least in
the special case of utilities, which are so important to the community. In
practical effect, therefore, the instant decision forecloses any possibility of
a "veto" power in the state, either by operation of the Act, or by the state's
external power over corporations.

Trade Regulation-Violation of Sherman Act as a Defense to a
Copyright Infringement Action-Plaintiff, a British print producer,
copyrighted certain engravings of old masters in the United States. Because of the relative inaccessibility of the old masters which were public
domain, defendant produced and sold lithographs, using proofs taken from
plaintiff's plates which carried notice of copyright. Plaintiff was admittedly in combination with others to limit production and fix minimum
prices of the engraving. Defendant asks that plaintiff be refused relief
because the copyrights are being used in violation of the Sherman Act.
The District Court held that the remedies of the Sherman Act are exclusive and plaintiff's activities in restraint of trade will not bar him from
suit against an infringer although the restraint would be taken into account
in mitigation of damages. Alfred Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts,.
Inc., 16 U. S. L. WEEK 2183 (S. D. N. Y. 1947).
The principal case points up the synthesis of two conflicting policies:
anti-monopoly views as opposed to the view favoring the protection of
private property interests in the form of copyrights. In the earlier infringement cases, courts refused to hold agreements by ropyright holders to
15. § 1(a) of the Act, 49 STAT. 803 (1935), 15 U. S. C. 79a (1940).
16. This results from reading § 11(e) of the Act with § 18(f). See, In re Laclede
Gas Light Company, et al., 57 F. Supp. 997, 1002 (E. D. Mo. 1944).
17. [Reply Brief for SEC, p. 11.] However, the state provision is as follows:
"1. A corporation subject to the provisions of the public service commission shall not
file such a certificate, nor shall the secretary of state accept or file such a certificate,
unless it shall have endorsed thereon the consent and approval of the commission having jurisdiction of such corporation." N. Y. STocK CoRP. LAw § 38. See also § 26a
of the same Act.
18. Cf. New Orleans Debenture Redemption Company v. Louisiana, 180 U. S. 320

(1900).
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limit production or fix minimum prices in restraint of trade.' To interpose
an anti-trust defense, it was necessary to show special damages arising
from the copyright, such a showing being rendered impossible by the
court's protection of the copyright. 2 The private property theory which
permitted holders of copyrights to do in concert what they might do individually was finally rejected in the case of Buck v. Gallagher,3 where the
court held a combination of copyright holders in restraint of trade. As a
procedural matter, the new federal rules 4 permitted a counterclaim against
holders of legal monopolies where their illegal practices had injured defendant infringer's business and to this extent effectuated anti-trust policy
by incorporating, in effect, a triple damage suit into the infringement suit.5
In the case of defendants who have not bden injured by plaintiff's illegal
practices, the only rationale for allowing such a defense is one of public
policy. But where the defendant is not injured, the district courts are not
willing to allow the anti-trust defense because it amounts to a confiscation
of private property. 6 In this respect, the defense had met with greater
success in the Supreme Court where patent holders who had extended
their legal monopoly to an illegal monopoly control over non-patented items
were precluded from suit against infringers.7 However, recently, a new
legal retreat in favor of private property was made in-the case of Bruce's
Juices v. American Can Co.8 where the court held on grounds of con1. Buck v. Hillsgrove Country Club, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 642, 645 (D. R. I. 1937).
"The right of a patentee, Owner of a copyright . . . is merely the right of exclusion
or debarment. The holder of such property right . . . is a czar in his own domain.
He may sell it or not, as he chooses. He may fix such prices as he pleases. He may
sell at one price to one person and another to another person. He is not required to
give reasons or deal fairly with purchasers."
2. Buck v. Hillsgrove, supra note 1; Buck v. Del Papa, 17 F. Supp. 645 (D. R. I.
1937) ; Radio Corp. of America v. Sylvania Corp., 10 F. Supp. 87 (D. N. J. 1934).
3. 36 F. Supp. 405 (S. D. Wash. 1940), 50 YALE L. J. 1114 (1941).
4. FED. R. Civ. P., 13(a).

5. Hancock Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 115 F. 2d 45 (C. C. A. 9th
1940).
6. See Harms v. Cohen, 279 Fed. 276, 280 (E. D. Pa. 1922). "If an infringer,
when the remedies are invoked, may set up as a defense that the copyright is the object
of an unlawful combination. . . . It would follow if one took possession of cattle
or beef belonging to a corporation, or individual, a member of a combination for fixing
the prices of cattle, or beef, in restraint of trade, he would be relieved from liability
to pay for the property so taken." See, e. g., Pastime Amusement Co. v. Witmark &
Sons, 12 F. 2d 1020 (C. C. A. 4th 1924) ; Buck v. Spanish Gables, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 36
(D. Mass. 1938).. A similar concern for property has been evinced in contract cases
where obligors on contracts made with corporations have attempted to avoid their
obligation on the ground that the corporation was in restraint of trade and the contract illegal. See Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U. S. 731 (1947).
For a comment on this case, while in the Florida Supreme Court, see 55 YALE L. J.
820 (1946).
7. Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U. S. 488 (1942) ; Mercoid Corp. v. Midcontinent Co., 320 U. S. 661 (1944). There is a divergence of opinion in the contract
situation where the debtor on a contract seeks to avoid it on the ground that the contract was void for illegality, thus escaping payment for purchases under it, e. g., contract was in furtherance of a conspiracy in restraint of trade. The Supreme Court
has held the validity of promissory notes unimpaired by proof that creditor-vendor
was a combination in restraint of trade where the contract was legal on its face. Connelly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 212 U. S. 227 (1909) ; Bruce's Juices v. American Can
Co., supra note 6. In two other decisions it reached a contra result on the theory that
the Connelly rule did not apply where the statutory violation bore a direct relation to
the contract in issue, e. g., misconduct on the face of the contract. Continental Wall
Paper Co. v. Voight & Sons, 212 U. S. 227 (1909) ; Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Co.,
317 U. S.173 (1942).
8. Supra note 6, 330 U. S. 731 (1947).
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gressional intent that the remedies of the Sherman Act (and its appendage,
the Robinson-Patman Act) were- exclusive. 9
Admitting regretfully that it was powerless, in the face of the Bruce
decision, to implement anti-trust policy by allowing the defense, the district court, faced with the dilemma of disallowing the defense and encouraging monopoly or allowing the defense and encouraging the pirating of
copyrights, split the problem down the middle by excluding the defense
but mitigating the damages. Such a decision is an effective monopoly
deterrent which, while it acts to deprive the plaintiff of some property,
does not in any event take from him what he would lose in a triple damage
suit. Such a decision in suits instituted by the dictates of private interest
converts them into a convenient and speedy substitute for the slower and
less effective suit sponsored by the government. Finally, the special genius
of the decision resides in the fact that it acts to vindicate the legal monopoly
while it deters or even destroys the illegal one. The property right has
been preserved; only its anti-social use has been squeezed out of its fabric
in the wringer of the law.
9. See Note, 55 YALE L. J. 820 (1946). Footnote 25 reads: "Representative
Wright Patman, co-author of the act (Robinson-Patman Act), has asked to enter the
instant case (Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co.) as amicus curiae on behalf of the
defendant. In a memorandum in support of his petition, Patman says, 'Such a denial
(of the defense) seems me to be contrary to the intent of Congress; to weaken the Act
by taking away its most available remedy, to diminish the protection against monopoly
which the Act throws about small business, and to impede the anti-trust policy which
the Act was meant to instrument.'"

